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While a growing scientific consensus recognizes that anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions are contributing to the global phenomenon known as climate change, little progress 
has been made to pass comprehensive legislation addressing climate change. Many 
concerned with the effects of climate change have turned to the American court system as a 
means of addressing climate change or reducing greenhouse gases.  Similar to the early 
litigation history of many environmental cases, climate change litigation has thus far been 
unsuccessful in holding major greenhouse gas emitters liable for the impacts of climate 
change.  Plaintiffs have not given up, however.  Many climate change cases are still pending.  
While there are several legal hurdles to overcome, the court system may provide an avenue to 
comprehensive climate change legislation in the United States.   
 
In order to better predict the future of climate change in the legal system, it is 
instructive to look to past environmental and public health litigation and regulation.  This 
paper looks to the histories of two other environmental health agents, asbestos and sulfur 
dioxide, to identify similarities between these substances and greenhouse gas emissions.  An 
examination of each substance’s scientific and regulatory history suggests what obstacles 
climate change plaintiffs may expect, including: the political question doctrine, standing, and 
causation.  A comparison with asbestos and sulfur dioxide suggests possible ways of 
overcoming these hurdles and reaching comprehensive climate change regulation in the 
United States.  The histories of asbestos and sulfur dioxide suggest that litigation and 
comprehensive federal legislation are both necessary to effectively reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
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In the American legal system, an extensive set of statutory and administrative 
regulatory mechanisms exist to protect United States citizens from harmful 
environmental agents; however, these regulatory approaches are often preceded by 
sometimes long histories of individuals relying on common law tort theories for 
protection.  Of importance in this paper, both federal statutes and regulations and the 
common law have provided protection from asbestos and remedies for individuals 
suffering from asbestos-related disease.  Likewise, common law theories and statutory 
regulations have helped reduce health impacts and property damage from sulfur dioxide.  
Similarly, individuals and states have attempted to use tort law as a tool to hold major 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters accountable for the effects of climate change because 
climate change victims lack the protection and tools of federal legislation or regulations.1
This paper focuses on how the United States legal system has addressed past 
environmental health threats and how the court system may provide a pathway to 
comprehensive climate change legislation.  Attempts to pass national legislation 
addressing climate change have been unsuccessful thus far.
  
As climate change progresses, it is likely more claims will arise, increasing the need for 
protective national laws mitigating the effects of climate change. 
2
                                               
1 Hilary Sigman, Legal Liability as Climate Change Policy, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1953, 1953 (2007). 
  To provide the foundation 
for the necessary laws addressing climate change, this paper examines two other 
environmental health agents:  asbestos and sulfur dioxide.  By considering the litigation 
and regulatory history of asbestos and sulfur dioxide, it is possible to make predictions 
about how to best use the legal system to address climate change in the United States.  
2 See Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Securities Act which was approved by the U.S. House 
of Representatives in 2009 but failed to pass the U.S. Senate.  H. R. Res. 2554, 111th Cong. (June 26, 
2009). 
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Both asbestos and sulfur dioxide are comparable with climate change in that they all are 
invisible environmental health threats exacerbated by human activity.  This paper first 
addresses asbestos, sulfur dioxide, and climate change individually and concludes with a 
comparison of the three substances, drawing lessons from asbestos and sulfur dioxide 
litigation and regulation that may help predict how to best address climate change in the 
U.S. legal system.  First, a basic introduction to each substance and its associated health 
effects is provided.  Then, how the court system addressed the substance is discussed, 
followed by a summary of statutory and administrative regulations addressing the 
substance.  Finally, the paper concludes with comparisons between the three substances’ 
litigation and regulatory histories and identifies the legal theories that may best succeed 
in addressing climate change. 
I. Asbestos 
A. Introduction to Asbestos 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines asbestos as, “the 
asbestiform varieties of serpentinite (chrysotile), riebeckite (crocidolite), cummingtonite-
grunerite, anthophyllite, and actinolite-tremolite.”3  More generally, asbestos includes 
several kinds of naturally occurring, hydrated silicate fibrous materials that can be woven 
and are heat resistant.4  Asbestos fibers are invisible to the naked eye and can travel 
through the air when disrupted or dislodged from other materials.5
                                               
3 60 C.F. R. § 61.141 (2011). 
  These properties 
make asbestos a highly useful material for a variety of manufactured goods, including: 
4U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA), Asbestos:  Basic Information, 
http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/help.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2012); Mansfield, Asbestos:  The Cases 
and the Insurance Problem, 14 Forum 860 (1980); Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 Forum 
341, 341-342 (1980). 
5 EPA, supra n. 4.  
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flooring tiles, paper products, cement, textiles, pipe and machinery coatings, and 
transmission and brake parts.6
While asbestos can be a very useful, it is also known to be very harmful to human 
health.  When exposed to airborne friable, or loose, asbestos fibers the risk of disease 
from the fibers imbedding in human lungs is significant.
   
7  Asbestosis, lung cancer, and 
mesothelioma are the three major health effects associated with exposure to asbestos.8  
All three asbestos-related diseases have long latency periods; generally twenty to forty 
years after exposure the symptoms appear.9
Asbestosis is a pneumoconsis, or lung disease resulting from extended inhalation 
of a mineral, occurring when asbestos fibers are inhaled, become lodged in lung tissue, 
and cause inflammation and scarring of the lung tissue.
 
10  As lung tissue is scarred, air 
sacs are destroyed and lung function is impaired.11  Individuals who have been exposed 
to friable asbestos are more likely to develop lung cancer than the general population.12  
Finally, mesothelioma is a rare cancer of the membrane in the thoracic or abdominal 
cavity lining and is most commonly associated with exposure to friable asbestos.13
 The health risks presented by asbestos have been documented for generations.  In 
1907, Dr. Montague Murray reported to a British government committee about the “evil 
effects” of inhaling asbestos dust after long periods without any symptoms.
   
14
                                               
6 EPA, supra n. 4.  
  In the 
7 Craig A. Etter, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation:  Is there an Alternative Theory of 
Liability? 16 Ind. L. Rev. 679, 679 (1982). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 680. 
10 Id. at 679, n.5. 
11 Id. 
12 EPA, supra n. 4.   
13 Etter, 16 Ind. L. Rev. at 679, n.7. 
14 Morris Greenberg, Classical Syndromes in Occupational Medicine:  The Montague Murray Case,  3 Am. 
J. Indus. Med. 351, 352-356 (1982). 
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years following, medical consensus grew that asbestos-related diseases are a serious and 
growing public health threat.   In 1924, the first medical paper on asbestos-related disease 
was released in the British Medical Journal, discussing the illness and death of Nellie 
Kershaw, an asbestos factory worker who was diagnosed with “asbestos poisoning” and 
died of lung fibrosis and tuberculosis.15  Following these and other medical reports 
documenting the dangers and cause of asbestosis, the British government enacted the 
Asbestos Industry Regulations in 1931 to control asbestos dust exposure.16
Also in the 1930s and continuing into the 1940s, evidence of a casual association 
between asbestos and lung cancer grew.
   
17 It was not until the 1960s that medical studies 
uncovered the relationship between asbestos inhalation and mesothelioma.18  During this 
time it was also discovered that the hazards of asbestos dust reached beyond workers in 
asbestos factories and included insulation workers, individuals using asbestos-containing 
products, and those living near asbestos factories.19
In the United States, the health risks of asbestos in textile factories was reported 
and documented by the Public Health Service in 1938.
   
20
                                               
15 P.W.J. Bartrip, History of Asbestos Related Disease,  80 Postgrad Med. J. 72 (2004); Irving J. Selikoff 
and Morris Greenberg, A Landmark Case in Asbestos.  265 J. Am. Med. Acad. 898,  898-899 (Feb. 20, 
1991). 
  Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s more medical studies in the United States established the dangers of asbestos dust 
inhalation. Although medical evidence had been building and the number of people 
suffering from asbestos-related disease continued to rise for decades, asbestos was not 
banned.  Given the usefulness of asbestos in fireproofing, insulation, and friction 
materials, asbestos use was permitted in England, but regulations to minimize dust 
16 P.W.J. Bartrip, supra n. 15, at 73. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1084 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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exposure continued.21  It was a different story in the United States, where no asbestos 
legislation was passed by Congress until 1970.22
B. Asbestos Litigation 
 
Despite decades of information on the dangers of asbestos exposure and 
regulation in England, no federal control of asbestos occurred in the United States until 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970.23  This was not the first time 
asbestos was addressed by the U.S. legal system, however.  A year prior to Congress 
enacting OSHA, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. was the first third party 
lawsuit claiming personal injury from asbestos exposure.24  In this landmark civil case, 
plaintiff Clarence Borel argued he contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma from exposure 
to asbestos containing insulation materials in his employment from 1936 to 1969.25  
Borel sued the defendant insulation manufacturers, whose products contained asbestos, in 
tort seeking damages for negligence, gross negligence, and breach of warranty or strict 
liability.26
                                               
21 P.W.J. Bartrip, supra n. 15 at 73. 
  Specifically, Borel alleged defendants were negligent for failing to warn him 
of asbestos dangers in their products, failing to test asbestos products, and failing to 
22 While asbestos has not been banned in the United States, many uses have been banned.  In 1989 the EPA 
attempted to ban and phase-out asbestos-containing products, but the agency’s rule was overturned by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1991.  Asbestos is now banned flooring felt, rollboard, corrugated paper, 
commercial paper, specialty paper.  Further, asbestos is prohibited from new uses in products that have not 
historically contained asbestos.  EPA, Asbestos Ban and Phase Out, http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/ 
ban.html (last updated June 7, 2010).   
23 P.W.J. Bartrip, supra n. 15 at 73; 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq (1970).  In passing OSHA, Congress 
recognized the forty year history of documented occupational harm from asbestos and called asbestos a 
material that “destroys the lives of workers.”  Sen. Rep.  91-1282 at 3 (Oct. 6, 1070). 
24 P.W.J. Bartrip, supra  n. 15 at 73.  Additionally, some states had sporadic industrial hygiene regulations 
beginning in the 1930s that addressed asbestos.  Id. 
25 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081. 
26 Id. at 1083.  A negligence claim is a common law theory where the defendant failed to act the manner 
and it caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Black’s Law Dictionary 1061 (8th ed., West 2004).  Gross negligence is 
a reckless disregard of a legal duty to another.  Id.  Breach of warranty occurs when a manufacturer 
provides a product in a defective condition.  Id. at 201.  Strict liability is imposed when a manufacturer 
sells an unreasonably dangerous product without adequate warnings of the product’s dangerous properties.  
Id. at 1245. 
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remove the products from the market after learning they could cause asbestosis.27  Borel 
also alleged defendants should be held strictly liable in warranty and tort for 
manufacturing unreasonably dangerous products without adequate warnings of the 
foreseeable dangers presented by the products.28  A defendant is strictly liable when an 
unreasonably dangerous product does not contain warnings for consumers that are 
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer at the time the product is sold.29
Healthy until the mid-1960s, Borel’s doctors attributed his illness to lung 
congestion and pleurisy and advised him to avoid asbestos dust.
 
30  Borel was diagnosed 
with pulmonary asbestosis in January 1969, which he testified was the first time he 
learned he had asbestosis.31  In 1970, Borel had surgery to remove his right lung when his 
doctors determined Borel had mesothelioma caused by asbestosis.32  At the trial court, 
medical evidence established that even light exposure to asbestos dust can cause 
asbestosis.33  Further evidence showed that asbestos-related diseases are difficult to 
diagnose due to long latency periods of ten to twenty-five years from initial exposure to 
symptoms.34
The jury found all but two defendants negligent, none grossly negligent, and 
Borel contributorily negligent.
   
35
                                               
27 Borel. 493 F.2d at 1086. 
  The jury also found that all defendants were strictly 
liable for selling an unreasonably dangerous product, meaning the product is “so 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1088. 
30 Id. at 1082. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1083. 
35 Id. at 1086. 
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dangerous that a reasonable man would not sell it if he knew of the risk involved.”36  The 
defendants were held jointly and severally liable, allowing Borel to collect his damages 
from one or more of the defendants.37
Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed the jury instruction may have 
been confusing, the court upheld the jury’s finding of strict liability.
  The defendants appealed, arguing the trial court 
judge improperly instructed the jury as to strict liability.   
38  The court held 
that the utility of asbestos in insulation may outweigh the known or foreseeable risk of 
asbestos-related disease.39  The court noted, however, asbestos-containing products are 
unreasonably dangerous if they do not have adequate warnings for users and 
consumers.40
Borel represents the challenges of many typical asbestos cases brought under 
common law torts theories, which have grown in number since the 1930s.  In 2002, 
730,000 asbestos cases had been filed, with the number of cases expected to continue to 
grow to as much as 3,000,000.
  Finally, the Court upheld the jury’s damages award in spite of the jury’s 
findings that Borel was contributorily negligent because Borel was not unreasonable in 
encountering the asbestos.   
41
                                               
36 Id. 
  In both Borel, as with many asbestos cases brought 
under traditional common law theories, proving causation and damages were difficult 
hurdles for the plaintiffs.  The plaintiff had to demonstrate that he or she had been 
exposed to asbestos, that the defendant manufactures had all supplied asbestos-containing 
materials used by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff developed an asbestos-related 
37 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1086-1087. 
38 Id. at 1090. 
39 Id. at 1089. 
40 Id. 
41 Robert O. Faulk, Symposium on Asbestos Litigation, 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 945, 948 (2003); see also Lester 
Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 833, 834 (2005). 
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disease.42
C. Asbestos Regulation  
  This was difficult for all asbestos plaintiffs due to the latency period of 
asbestos-related diseases.  Knowing the exact date of an asbestos exposure is difficult 
over decades working in an industry using asbestos-containing products.  Further, it was 
impossible to medically determine which individual asbestos exposure caused a disease.  
Plaintiffs who were successful in proving causation benefitted from doctrines like the 
substantial factor test, arguing that all defendants each supplied asbestos-containing 
materials that each was individually sufficient to bring about the plaintiff’s disease.  This 
common law theory allowed plaintiffs like Borel to hold defendants jointly and severally 
liable and therefore collect damages even if a plaintiff could not prove the exact source of 
asbestos exposure.   
While asbestos litigation continues to grow, the United States has now enacted 
several statutes and countless administrative regulations for asbestos.  The most common 
statutes under which asbestos is regulated are OSHA43 and the Clean Air Act (CAA).44  
Originally enacted in 1970, OSHA was the first federal statute addressing asbestos, 
requiring employers to monitor how much asbestos employees were exposed to and 
eventually required warnings and measures to reduce exposure.45  Under the CAA 
asbestos is listed as a hazardous air pollutant46 and national emissions standards were 
promulgated for asbestos.47
                                               
42 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1088. 
  These statutes are designed to minimize future asbestos 
exposure, but do little to provide remedies for people already suffering from asbestos-
43 29 U.S.C. §§ 652, et seq. (1970). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970).  The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 is another statute that 
heavily regulates asbestos and limits the places and application of asbestos-containing materials.  15 U.S.C 
§§ 2601 et seq. (1976). 
45 29 U.S.C. § 652 (1970); 37 Fed. Reg. 11318, 11322 (June 7, 1972). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1970). 
47 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.01 et seq. (2011); 40 C.F.R. §§ 140 et seq. (2011). 
9 
 
related diseases.48  Although there are numerous federal statutes and administrative 
regulations on asbestos and the health risks associated with asbestos, its use is not 
prohibited but is limited to only specific applications.49  Asbestos lawsuits relying on 
state common law theories continue today.50
*** 
  Congress has not explicitly stated that 
federal asbestos legislation has preempted state or common law theories, therefore 
allowing litigation to continue.   
As discussed in later sections, asbestos may be instructive to climate change 
litigants.  Asbestos litigation demonstrates how the doctrine of the substantial factor test 
may be used to prove causation when it is difficult to single out one defendant and one 
discrete event brought about the plaintiff’s harm.  Further, asbestos regulation 
demonstrates that even when an environmental health threat is regulated many individual 
injuries remain unresolved.  This may be the case for costal climate change plaintiffs who 
are currently losing land due to warming temperatures and strong storms.  It is also 
probable that like sulfur dioxide, discussed below, if comprehensive national legislation 
regulating GHG emissions is enacted, climate change lawsuits may change focus and sue 
to enforce regulations, rather than recover damages from past injuries. 
                                               
48 29 U.S.C. §§ 652 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641 et seq. (1990). 
49 Jennifer L. Leonardi, It’s Still Here!  The Continuing Battle over Asbestos in America.  16 Vill. Envtl. L. 
J. 129, 129 (2005). 
50 While there are civil enforcement provisions in the CAA that allow citizens to sue for a violation of 
asbestos emissions standards (see 42 U.S.C. § 7604), it is arguable that individuals harmed by asbestos 
exposure continue to rely on the common law because common remedies include damages whereas the 
CAA civil provisions do not. 
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II. Sulfur Dioxide  
A. Introduction of Sulfur Dioxide 
Sulfur dioxide is a naturally occurring, highly reactive gas listed as one of six 
criteria pollutants under the CAA.51  Fossil fuel combustion in power plants is the largest 
source of sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States, followed by industrial facilities.52  
Along with nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide is a major contributor to acid rain and is known 
to impact human respiratory health.  Studies early in the Industrial Revolution suspected 
that burning fossil fuels and the release of sulfur dioxide negatively affected human 
health.  As early as the 1930s, studies in Europe began noting a connection between 
respiratory disease and air pollution.53  Subsequent studies comparing sulfur dioxide 
exposure between employees working in London and employees in smaller country 
towns with lower sulfur dioxide levels found that longevity was diminished with higher 
sulfur dioxide exposure.54
By 1970, the relationship between sulfur dioxide and respiratory disease was well 
documented.
   
55  Asthmatics and people with other respiratory diseases are most sensitive 
to sulfur dioxide exposure, but even people without respiratory impairments can be 
harmed by sulfur dioxide gas.  At concentrations over 2.0 parts per million (ppm) sulfur 
dioxide can affect respiration of healthy adults.56
                                               
51 EPA.  Six Common Pollutants:  Sulfur Dioxide,  http://www.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/index.html 
(last updated March 23, 2012). 
  At concentrations less than 2.0ppm, 
sulfur dioxide affects sensitive groups, like individuals with asthma.  At higher levels of 
52 Id. 
53 C. Arden Pope III, David V. Bates, and Mark E. Raizenne.  Health Effects of Particulate Air Pollution:  
Time for Reassessment? 103 Envtl. Health Persp. 472, 472 (May 1995). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 61 Fed. Reg. 25566, 25570 (May 22, 1996). 
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sulfur dioxide concentration or with elevated levels of respiration, as in moderate 
exercise, asthmatics experience moderately severe reactions.57
Although the health impacts are well documented, sulfur dioxide is perhaps better 
known for its role in the phenomenon known as acid rain, where sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides released during the burning of fossil fuels mix in the atmosphere, collect 
in water vapors, and rain down as acidic precipitation.
 
58  As early as 1907-1908 acidic 
rain and deposits in soil were noted in England.59  Acid rain can be very damaging to 
human-made structures and severely impacts ecological systems.60
B. Sulfur Dioxide Litigation 
   
Much like early asbestos litigation, early in the twentieth century those suffering 
from damage caused by sulfur dioxide released during fossil fuel combustion turned to 
the common law for relief.  Many of these cases relied on the common law theory of 
public nuisance.  A public nuisance is an “unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public.”61  An interference is unreasonable if it “involves a significant 
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort 
or the public convenience,” or “the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a 
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a 
significant effect upon the public right.”62
In a very early case addressing property damage from sulfur dioxide, the court 
had to balance the interests of landowners claiming property damage from sulfur dioxide 
   
                                               
57 Id. at 25571. 
58 EPA.  What is Acid Rain.  http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what/index.html (last updated June 8, 2007). 
59 Gene E. Likens, F. Herbert Bormann, and Noye M. Johnson.  Acid Rain.  14 Environment 33, 35 (March 
1972). 
60 Id. 
61 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979). 
62 Id. at § 821B(2)(a). 
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emissions and the economic benefits of an ore smelting company.63  In McCleery v. 
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., a group of similarly situated landowners complained that 
ores smelted by defendant Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., released sulfur dioxide into 
the air and when the compound made contact with moisture in the air, it created sulfuric 
rain that damaged vegetation on plaintiffs’ properties.64  The plaintiffs sued seeking an 
injunction to stop Highland Boy from continuing operations that caused sulfuric rain.65  
The court held that if Highland Boy did not compensate the plaintiffs for their property 
damage, Highland Boy would be enjoined from continuing smelting practices.66
In another series of cases in the early twentieth century, Georgia sought an 
injunction against the Tennessee Copper Co. on the grounds of a public nuisance.
  This 
case again demonstrates how common law tort principles were used before statutes and 
regulations offered protection from injurious sulfur dioxide. 
67  
Georgia sued on behalf of its citizens alleging that Tennessee Copper Co.’s industrial 
activities, located near the state line, caused sulfur dioxide gas emissions that destroyed 
forests, orchards, crops, and inflicted other injuries in five counties in Georgia.68  In 
assessing whether Georgia could assert a public nuisance claim on behalf of its citizens 
for damage to privately owned property, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that Georgia was 
entitled to sue in its capacity as a quasi-sovereign and that Georgia had an interest 
independent of its private citizens in protecting the state’s earth, air, and forests.69
                                               
63 McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (D. Utah 1904). 
   
64 Id. at 951. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 954-955. 
67 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
68 Id. at 236-237. 
69 Id. at 619. 
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The Court agreed that sulfur dioxide can mix with moisture in the air to become 
sulfurous acid that can then travel by wind and damage forests, crops and human health.70  
The Court also noted that the effects of acid rain are relatively localized, which helped 
the plaintiffs assert that the sulfur dioxide emissions came from Tennessee Copper Co. 
and not other sources.  In so concluding, the Court held that Georgia could seek an 
injunction if Tennessee Copper Co.’s efforts to minimize sulfur dioxide emissions failed 
to cease property damage in Georgia.71
After laws regulating sulfur dioxide emissions were enacted in the 1970s, lawsuits 
over sulfur dioxide changed focus.  Instead of most litigants relying on common law 
torts, many cases now involve plaintiffs suing to require the federal government to 
strengthen or enforce existing regulations.  At issue in American Lung Assoc. v. EPA was 
the EPA Administrator’s finding that “bursts” of sulfur dioxide exposure for asthmatics 
likely caused disruption of ongoing activities, required medication, and possibly required 
medical attention.
  Here again, common law tort principles provided 
some relief to those whose land and health were damaged from sulfur dioxide emissions.   
72  The American Lung Association sued demanding the EPA 
promulgate additional NAAQS for five-minute bursts capping sulfur dioxide emissions at 
0.60 ppm to protect the national’s nine million asthmatics.73
                                               
70 Id. at 620. 
  The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia held the EPA Administrator must adequately explain the 
conclusion not to promulgate a more stringent national standard for sulfur dioxide 
71 Id.  
72 Am. Lung Assoc. v. Env. Protec. Agency, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (1998) [hereinafter Am. Lung. Assoc. v. 
EPA]. 
73 Id. at 391. 
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emissions to protect the health of asthmatics and other sensitive groups in light of the 
documented public health effect.74
Pursuant to the CAA, once the EPA Administrator finds a pollutant “may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” and the pollutant derives 
from “numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources” the EPA Administrator must 
provide data on the identifiable public health effects associated with the pollutant.
   
75  The 
EPA Administrator must determine a level of safety to protect the public health from 
adverse effects from the pollutant and set national standards to limit emissions within the 
margin of safety.76  These safety levels, known as national ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS), must establish a level of safety to protect sensitive citizens as well as healthy 
citizens.77
The Court held that it is within the Administrator’s authority to determine if burst 
exposure to asthmatics presents a public health concern requiring an additional NAAQS, 
but that the Administrator failed to explain her reasoning for not issuing the new 
NAAQS.
   
78  Therefore, the Court remanded the case for the Administrator to further 
explain her reasoning, but cautioned that the Administrator does not necessarily have 
broad discretion to decline to establish a margin of safety when adverse health effects are 
documented.79
                                               
74 Id. at 388. 
  It was not until 2010 that the EPA changed the sulfur dioxide NAAQS.  
After years conducting new clinical, epidemiological, and toxicological studies the EPA 
75 Id. at 389, citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994); 42 U.S.C. 7408 
(a)(2) (1994). 
76 Am. Lung Assoc. v. EPA, 134 F.3d at 389, citing Lead Industries Assoc., Inc. v. Env. Protec. Agency, 647 
F.2d 1130, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
77 Am. Lung Assoc. v. EPA, 134 F.3d at 389, citing Sen. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 10 (1970); Lead Industries 
Assoc., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d, at 1152-1153. 
78 Am. Lung Assoc. v. EPA, 134 F.3d at 392. 
79 Id. at 393. 
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issued an Integrated Science Assessment in 2008 finding a causal relationship between 
bursts of sulfur dioxide exposure and respiratory morbidity.80  The new NAAQS limits 
sulfur dioxide to 75 parts per billion (ppb) in one hour, reduced from the original .14 ppm 
in twenty four hours or a 0.03 ppm annual average.81
These sulfur dioxide cases demonstrate the use of the court system both with and 
without a statutory code to protect the public health.  Where there is no statute or 
regulation in place, plaintiffs may rely on common law torts to seek remedies.  Where 
statutes and regulations are available, plaintiffs may sue to see that they are properly 
administered and enforced. 
 
C. Sulfur Dioxide Regulations 
While sulfur dioxide is regulated under a few federal statutes, including OSHA, it 
is most heavily regulated under the CAA.  As discussed in the case above, sulfur dioxide 
is a criteria pollutant under the CAA.82  The EPA Administrator is directed to establish 
NAAQS for air pollutants that cause or contribute to air pollution which “may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”83  The EPA Administrator is also 
tasked with establishing primary and secondary NAAQS.84  Primary NAAQS are 
standards that allow for an “adequate margin of safety” to protect the public health.85  
Primary NAAQS are to be “the maximum permissible ambient air level” to protect 
sensitive populations.86
                                               
80 EPA.  Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Sulfur Oxides – Health Criteria (Final Report).  
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=198843 (last updated Sept 12, 2008). 
  Secondary NAAQS set a level of air quality required to “protect 
81 75 Fed. Reg. 35520 (June 22, 2010); 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (April 30, 1971). 
82 EPA, supra n. 50. 
83 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1970). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1970). 
85 Id. 
86 Sen. Rep. No. 91-1196 at 10 (1970). 
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the public welfare from known or anticipated adverse effects” of a pollutant.87  The 
welfare effects covered by secondary NAAQS include effects on soil, water, crops, 
vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, climate, property 
damage, transportation hazards, and economic and personal comfort and wellbeing.88
In regulating sulfur dioxide as an acid rain threat, the EPA noted that acid rain 
deposits contain multiple criteria pollutants, including:  sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, 
and particular matter.  To address acid rain effects, Congress passed the 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendments (1990 CAA Amendments) and created the Acid Rain Program to 
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 10 million tons below 1980 levels.
  
89
Beginning in 1995, the EPA allocated allowances to utilities directing how many 
pounds of sulfur dioxide may be released from the utility.  In this manner, EPA sets the 
total number of tons of sulfur dioxide emitted from fossil fuel burning utilities.
       
90   Each 
year EPA may reduce the total number of allowances available, causing utilities to either 
reduce how much sulfur dioxide produced, or purchase allowances from another utility 
that had emitted fewer tons of sulfur dioxide than it held in allowances.91
                                               
87 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
  Beginning in 
88 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1970). 
89 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549 (1990).  To reach this goal, an innovative market-
based approached was adopted.  Utilities and entities regulated under the Acid Rain Program can choose 
from two methods of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions.  Utilities can either: 1. develop and use energy 
conservation measures, increase use of renewable energy sources, reduce fossil fuel usage, install pollution 
control techniques, or use low-sulfur fuel sources; or 2. purchase allowances from other utilities to offset 
sulfur dioxide emissions.  EPA, Acid Rain Program SO2 Allowances Fact Sheet.  
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/factsheet.html#who (last updated April 14, 2009). 
Those utilities that reduce their sulfur dioxide emissions can auction off unused allowances equaling the 
level of sulfur dioxide reductions the utility achieved through measures like pollution control techniques. 
Id. 
90 EPA, supra n. 88. 
91 Id. 
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2010, sulfur dioxide allowances are capped at 8.95 million units each year to maintain 
emissions reductions over time.92
The Acid Rain Program has been successful in driving down sulfur dioxide 
emissions associated with acid rain, and therefore also reduced emissions causing 
harmful health effects in humans.  The cap-and-trade model employed to reduce acid rain 
is widely touted as an innovative combination of traditional regulation (setting the cap) 
and market-based regulation (allowing utilities to select the best method to reduce their 
sulfur dioxide emissions).  These regulations continue to protect against sulfur dioxide 
emissions reaching dangerous levels once again.  Now the regulations are used in 
combination with litigation and market-based principles to limit sulfur dioxide. 
   
*** 
 Like asbestos, sulfur dioxide may prove educational for climate change litigation 
and regulation.  As discussed in later sections, many current climate change lawsuits are 
relying on common law public nuisances, as was the case in many early sulfur dioxide 
cases.  Perhaps the most instructive piece of sulfur dioxide’s litigation and regulatory 
history is the consequence of effective comprehensive national emissions standards set 
through statute and administrative regulation.  Following the 1990 CAA Amendments, 
few sulfur dioxide lawsuits sought injunctions to stop all pollution because the regulatory 
standards prevented most property damage associated with sulfur dioxide.  If similar 
comprehensive national legislation and administrative regulations are passed and 
effective in driving down U.S. GHG emissions, perhaps fewer climate change plaintiffs 
will have to rely on common law theories like public nuisance for relief.   
                                               
92 Id. 
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III. Climate Change 
A. Introduction to Climate Change 
Like asbestos and sulfur dioxide, the GHG effect fueling climate change also has 
a long history.  The six anthropogenic GHGs contributing to climate change are: carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride.93  The most important of these gases in measuring the GHG effect is carbon 
dioxide.94
Scientists have studied the GHG effect since it was first described by a French 
physicist in 1824.
  The long history documenting the GHG effect and relationship between 
anthropogenic GHG emissions and a warming climate began in the late 1800s and 
continues today. 
95  In 1896, a Swedish chemist proposed the idea of the GHG effect and 
hypothesized that burning coal in the industrial revolution would increase carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere and warm the earth.96  As research continued, evidence of a warming 
climate caused by GHGs grew.  In 1988, Dr. James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute 
for Space Studies reported to the U.S. Senate that “with 99% confidence” the nearly 0.4 
degrees Centigrade global warming from 1950 to 1987 is “a real warming trend” related 
to increased GHG emissions.97
                                               
93 50 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2012). 
  Also in 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was created by the United Nations to report on the scientific evidence of 
94 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (hereinafter IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 
Summary for Policy Makers 5, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf 
(accessed April 8, 2012). 
95 Matthew Knight, A Timeline of Climate Change Science, http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/ 
03/31/ intro.timeline/index.html (May 14, 2008). 
96 Id. 
97Sen. Comm. Energy & Nat. Resources, Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change, Part 2, 100th 
Cong., (June 23, 1988) . 
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climate change.98  In 1990, IPCC released the First Assessment Report, which predicted a 
faster increase in the mean global temperature than had been seen in the previous 10,000 
years.99  In 2007, the most recent report from the IPCC stated, “GHG emissions due to 
human activities have grown since pre-industrial times with an increase of 70% between 
1970 and 2004,” and it is “very likely” that the observed average global temperature 
increases are caused by the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG emissions.100
Climate scientists have now reached a consensus that GHGs are the gases that 
trap heat in the earth’s atmosphere and increase the average global temperature.
 
101  The 
international community of climate scientists agrees that humans are contributing to 
climate change through the increased release of GHGs.102  In recent years, scientists 
began examining the particular environmental and human health effects of a warming 
climate.  Consensus about these effects is not as well developed as the belief that 
anthropogenic GHG emissions are causing a warming climate.  There is, however, 
growing evidence that a warming climate may produce more extreme climate events like 
longer, more frequent heat waves, increased wind speeds in tropical cyclones, and 
intensified droughts.103  Some injuries, like land loss to rising sea levels are well 
documented, as in the Massachusetts v. EPA case discussed below.104
                                               
98 Matthew Knight, supra n. 94. 
   
99 IPCC, IPCC First Assessment Report 52,  http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20 
Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf  
(accessed April 8, 2012). 
100 IPCC, supra n. 93 at 5. 
101EPA, Frequently Asked Questions about Global Warming and Climate Change: Back to Basics 3, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/Climate_Basics.pdf (last updated May 20, 2010). 
102 IPCC, supra n. 93. 
103 IPCC, Managing the Ricks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation:  A 
Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 13, 
http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf (accessed April 25, 2012).  Critics 
who suggest that GHGs are not the cause of increased loss from events like tropical cyclones; instead some 
argue increased loss is a function of more development and capital in historically vulnerable areas 
subjected to tropical cyclones.  Roger A. Pielke.  The Climate Fix:  What Scientists and Politicians Won’t 
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Regionally, wildfires in the arid western United States are expected to increase in 
frequency due to longer periods of drought in light of increased GHG emissions.105
The increasing GHG emissions come from many sources, but the major emitters 
include the U.S. as a country, and the U.S. energy industry in particular.  Until 2006, the 
U.S. emitted more carbon dioxide, than any other nation in the world.
  
Evidence is growing to better establish specific impacts to humans and environment from 
a warming climate.  The scientific consensus regarding the impacts of GHGs has not yet 
reached the level of certainty of the causes of asbestos-related diseases or sulfur dioxide’s 
impacts to respiratory health or acid rain.  This may be one reason climate change 
plaintiffs have had difficulty proving causation, an element of common law claims 
discussed below. 
106  In 2006, China 
surpassed the U.S. in carbon dioxide emissions.107  That does not mean the U.S. has 
experienced a dramatic reduction in GHG emissions, however.  From 1990 to 2007, U.S. 
GHG emissions increased by 16.7%.108  A major contributor to GHGs in the U.S. is the 
energy industry.  Over 80% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 2007 were from the 
energy industry, including energy generation and transportation.109
                                                                                                                                            
Tell You About Global Warming.  (Basic Books 2010).  The IPCC does consider the level of exposure and 
vulnerability of a region when making predictions about extreme events related to climate change.  IPCC, 
Managing the Ricks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation:  A Special 
Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 13, 
http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf (accessed April 25, 2012).   
   Electricity 
104 IPCC, supra n. 102 at 13.   
105 D. McKenzie, F.A. Heinsch, W.E. Heilamn, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Climate 
Change Resource Center: Wildfire and Climate Change,  http://www.fs.fed.us.ccrc.topics.wildlife-
fire.shtml (last updated Jan. 17, 2011).  
106 China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. Times (June 20, 2007).  Available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html (accessed May 8, 
2012). 
107 Id. 
108 Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2007,   
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/ggrpt/057307.pdf (Dec. 2008). 
109 Id. 
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generation alone consumed 36% of fossil fuel energy in 2010.110  Beginning in 2005, 
however, carbon dioxide emissions from the industrial energy-related sector began to 
drop and are now below 1990 levels 111
Changes in the U.S. economy, like the shift from a manufacturing-based economy 
to a service-based economy, are helping industry-related emissions decline.
.   
112
Although climate change is recognized as a human-influenced problem and the 
evidence of the harmful effects of a warming climate is growing, reductions in GHG 
emissions have been slow.  In 1997, industrialized nations agreed to reduce their GHG 
emissions to an average of 5% below each country’s 1990 emissions level in the Kyoto 
Protocol.
  While 
total U.S. emissions are increasing, the proportion attributed to the industrial sector is 
declining.  With the increasing emissions from China, the proportionate impact of the 
U.S. energy industry’s GHG emissions becomes less substantial than it was in previous 
years. 
113  The U.S. Senate, on a 95-0 vote, issued a resolution opposing the United 
States’ signing the Protocol.114  In 2001, the U.S. opposed the Kyoto Protocol under the 
direction of the George W. Bush Administration.115
Since withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the issue of climate change has been 
hotly contested in the U.S.  There have been attempts to regulate climate change 
   
                                               
110 EPA.  Executive Summary:  2012 U.S. Greenhouse gas Inventory Report,  ES-9 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html (last updated April 16, 2012). 
111 The industrial energy sector includes carbon dioxide emissions from combustion and process emission 
from agriculture, coal mines, petroleum and natural gas pipelines, industrial process emissions, stationary 
combustion of methane and nitrous oxide, purchased electricity from, electric power generation, and 
electricity transmission. Energy Information Administration, supra n. 107. 
112 EPA, supra n.109 at  ES-8. 
113 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_ 
protocol/  items/2830.php/ (accessed April 8, 2012). 
114 Sen. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (July 25, 1997). 
115 George W. Bush, Letter to U.S. Senate, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/03/20010314.html (March 13, 2001). 
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nationally116 and at the state level;117
B. Climate Change Litigation:  Threshold Challenges 
 however, no comprehensive regulatory scheme has 
been developed in the United States.  As in early asbestos and sulfur dioxide cases, many 
concerned about the damage from climate change are turning to the court system and 
common law.  Several climate change cases have been decided that are influencing 
domestic climate change policy.  Based on the history of asbestos and sulfur dioxide, 
continuing climate change litigation may serve as an initial step toward national 
legislation of GHGs.  
Climate change plaintiffs have faced two common challenges in bringing a 
lawsuit:  the political question doctrine and the doctrine of standing.  Both of these 
challenges are threshold jurisdictional issues the courts consider before addressing the 
merits of a case.  If a court finds the political question is present or standing is not 
satisfied, the court will not have jurisdiction to hear the case. 
1. Climate Change and the Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine precludes judicial action and is frequently raised 
by climate change defendants.  The political question doctrine is a judicial doctrine used 
to ensure the separation of powers is upheld.  It is designed to prevent the judicial branch 
from intruding into an area of law committed to either the executive or legislative 
branches of government.118  If the doctrine applies, the court may not hear the case.119
                                               
116 50 C.F.R. at § 52.21. 
  
Six factors were developed to determine if the political question doctrine applies, known 
117 California’s Climate Change Program, which is working to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020, is one example of state regulatory efforts.  California Environmental Protection Agency, Climate 
Change Program, Background http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/cc.htm  (accessed April 8, 2012). 
118 U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
(recognized there are limitations on federal courts to prevent the courts from asserting jurisdiction over a 
matter better addressed by another branch of government). 
119 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 at 170.   
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as the Baker factors.120
1. a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or 
  The first three factors are used most frequently to determine if a 
political question exists.  These three factors ask if there is: 
2. a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving [the case]; or 
3. impossibility of deciding [the case] without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion?121
 
 
Climate change litigants have had great difficulty overcoming the second and 
third factors of the political question doctrine.  For example, the case of the Native  
Village of Kivalina and City of Kivalina, who sued major GHG emitters under a federal 
common law public nuisance theory, was dismissed by the district court on the grounds 
that there were no judicially-discoverable or manageable standards to guide the court in 
rendering a decision on the appropriate level of GHG emissions122   The district court 
further held that it would have had to make an initial policy determination when 
balancing the interest of the defendants’ to pollute against the interest of the plaintiffs’ to 
have GHG emissions reduced, as would be required in a nuisance claim.123
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, Inc. (Conn. v. AEP) the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held no political question was presented.
  However, 
one climate change case has successfully overcome these Baker factors.   
124
                                               
120 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 216 (1962). 
  In this case 
the plaintiffs, eight states, the City of New York, and three land trusts sued six 
corporations who owned and operated fossil-fuel powered electricity plants under the 
121 Id. The final three factors ask:  whether adjudication of the case would demonstrate a lack of respect for 
a political branch; whether there is “an unusual need for adherence to a political decision” that has been 
made previously; or whether deciding the case would cause embarrassment from having multiple decisions 
regarding a single issue. Id.    
122 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal filed. 
123 Id.   
124 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 582 F.3d 309, 398 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d in part and rev’d in part. 
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federal common law doctrine of public nuisance seeking a carbon dioxide emissions cap 
be placed on defendants. 125   Plaintiffs alleged the defendants made substantial 
contributions to elevated levels of carbon dioxide, causing harm to the states and 
ecological damage to the land trusts’ properties.126  Specifically, plaintiff states and land 
trusts alleged injuries including loss of snowpack providing freshwater for the residents 
of California and future injuries including:  increased illnesses and deaths from heat 
waves, smog, and respiratory problems; sea level rises and increased damage to costal 
infrastructure; and increased wildfires.127  Plaintiffs made a claim under federal common 
law nuisance and alternatively under state statutory or common law, and requested an 
injunction to abate GHG emissions from the defendants through a carbon dioxide cap.128
In response, the defendants first argued that if carbon dioxide emissions should be 
subject to limits or restrictions, this is textually committed to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause.
   
129  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals quickly dismissed this 
argument as it was unsupported.130  The defendants also argued that the first Baker factor 
was implicated because regulation of GHGs emissions would interfere with the 
President’s authority over foreign relations by disturbing the President’s efforts for 
achieving international emissions reduction.131  Again the court dismissed this claim as 
plaintiffs were only seeking to limit emissions from domestic electricity plants, which 
does not interfere with international emissions regulation or foreign policy.132
                                               
125 Id. at 316. 
 
126 Id. at 317-319. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 324. 
130 Id. 
131 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 582 F.3d at 324. 
132 Id. at 325. 
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Finding no textual commitment granting the political branches responsibility to 
address emissions reduction, the court moved to the second Baker factor.  The defendants 
argued that the court lacks the standards or expertise to determine the appropriate 
emissions levels and who should be held accountable for emissions.133  The Second 
Circuit found that the issue in this case was a question of federal common law public 
nuisance and federal courts have been hearing public nuisance claims for over a hundred 
years.134  Further, the court found that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 821 
provides the standard for adjudicating public nuisances.135  The court held it had well 
established standards and adequate expertise to hear the claim.136
Turning to the third Baker factor the court found that it did not have to make an 
initial policy determination to decide the case.
 
137  The defendants argued that the court 
would have to determine what an acceptable level of emissions is and who should be held 
accountable for emitting carbon dioxide.138  In rejecting this argument the court found 
that this was merely an ordinary tort of public nuisance.  Where a case involves an 
ordinary tort there is no possibility of making an initial policy determination.139
The court quickly dismissed the remaining Baker factors as inapplicable because 
resolving the case did not require contradicting prior political decisions as there is no 
 
                                               
133 Id. at 326. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 329.  Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public” and lists circumstances that may be unreasonable as “ (a) 
Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public 
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, 
ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced 
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect 
upon the public right.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B. 
136 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 582 F.3d at 329. 
137 Id. at 331. 
138 Id. at 330. 
139 Id. at 331. 
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uniform policy on GHG emissions.140  In so holding, the court concluded that the 
political question doctrine was not applicable and plaintiffs could proceed with their 
federal common law nuisance claim.141
On appeal, a divided U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit’s finding of 
jurisdiction, affirming that a political question was not presented.
  The defendants then appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.   
142  The U.S. Supreme 
Court held, however, that because the EPA has now begun regulating carbon dioxide 
emissions under the CAA, the federal common law nuisance claim asserted by plaintiffs 
is displaced by federal law and may not proceed.143  The Court noted that the federal 
common law is displaced by legislation when a statute “speak[s] directly to [the] 
question” presented.144  Therefore, the EPA, as authorized by the CAA to list and set 
emissions criteria for pollutants “speaks directly” to carbon dioxide emissions from 
defendants’ plants.145
Climate change plaintiffs have had great difficulty in overcoming the political 
question doctrine.  With the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal’s finding that a political question is not presented, perhaps more 
climate change plaintiffs will more easily satisfy this jurisdictional requirements to bring 
a claim.  A new challenge is presented, however, in that federal common law theories are 
likely to be displaced by the relatively few EPA carbon dioxide regulations. 
   
                                               
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 332. 
142 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
143 Id. at  2537. 
144 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2537, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 
U.S. 618, 625 (1978). 
145 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
27 
 
2. Standing for a Climate Change Plaintiff 
The second jurisdictional issue preventing many climate change cases from 
proceeding to the merits of the case is the doctrine of standing.  This doctrine has three 
requirements that must be satisfied before a court will hear a case.146  In order to bring a 
claim against major GHG emitters in the U.S., a plaintiff must be able to assert an injury-
in-fact, show that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and the relief sought will 
actually remedy the injury.147  Many climate change plaintiffs have faced challenges 
proving an injury-in-fact and tracing the injury to the defendant.  For example, in the 
recent federal district court case of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, the plaintiffs sued for 
monetary damages as their Alaskan village is no longer inhabitable.148   The protective 
ice shelf surrounding the village has melted and the village is now subjected to damaging 
storms.149
Plaintiffs in Kivalina alleged that fossil fuel burning electric power plants in the 
U.S. emit approximately 2.6 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, the largest source 
of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States.
   
150  Further, plaintiffs alleged 19 
companies accounted for half of the emissions associated with electricity production in 
the U.S. in 2004.151  In Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, the district court held the plaintiffs could 
not establish the source of the GHG emissions causing the ice shelf to melt came from the 
defendants.152  Therefore the requirement of traceability was not satisfied.153
                                               
146 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
  In so 
concluding, the court made no mention of the substantial factor test , as discussed above 
147 Id. 
148 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d  at 1. 
149 Id. 
150 Br. of App. at 7, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1. 
151 Id. 
152 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d at 12-13. 
153 Id. 
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in the asbestos cases.  It is possible that the courts ignored this principles in climate 
change cases thus far because the doctrine applies when proving the prima facie elements 
of a tort claim and is not typically used to assert jurisdiction.   
Further, as countries like China continue to emit a greater portion of the global 
GHGs, the GHG emissions from U.S. electricity generating plants are comparatively less 
significant.  It may be harder for a plaintiff to trace U.S. GHG emissions to a particular 
injury as other international GHG emissions increase.  This will likely be an ongoing 
issue for plaintiffs in satisfying traceability or the substantive element of causation.  The 
pending Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil may help 
shed light on the level of contribution of GHGs courts view is necessary to satisfy the 
traceability element.   
A previous case, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (Mass. v. 
EPA), may serve as a model for future climate change plaintiffs to prove standing.  In 
Mass. v. EPA, twelve states, four local governments, and several private organizations 
sued the EPA, arguing the EPA had abandoned its responsibility pursuant to the CAA to 
regulate emissions of four GHGs, including carbon dioxide.154  In 1998, Jonathan Z. 
Cannon, EPA General Counsel, determined that carbon dioxide emissions are within the 
scope of agency’s regulatory authority.155  The EPA chose not to exercise this authority, 
however.156  The EPA argued that GHGs had a history of regulation from Congress 
which prevented the EPA from regulating GHGs.157
                                               
154 Mass. v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 504 (2007). 
  The U.S. Supreme Court denied the 
argument, reasoning that other regulation and legislation merely promotes “interagency 
155 Id. at 510. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 512. 
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collaboration and research to better understand … climate change,” which complements 
the EPA’s regulatory efforts.158
The Court held that the plaintiffs, Massachusetts in particular, had standing to 
bring the claim.  Massachusetts could establish an injury-in-fact because it was losing 
state coastal land to rising sea levels.
   
159  In so holding, the Court looked to Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co. which held that states may sue in their capacity as quasi-
sovereigns for the protection of “the earth and air within” the state.160  Because 
Massachusetts is a quasi-sovereign and could assert a loss to its coastal land due to rising 
sea level, the injury in fact element was satisfied.161  The Supreme Court also found that 
traceability was satisfied because although the EPA would only be regulating emissions 
from new vehicles, these emissions are a “meaningful contribution” to domestic GHG 
emissions and climate change because transportation emissions are a significant portion 
of the U.S. GHG emissions.162  Finally, the Court held that a reduction of domestic 
emissions would reduce global emissions.163  Even if this reduction would not resolve the 
issue of climate change, it would still reduce emissions and limit the growing problem of 
climate change.164  Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the 
suit.165
                                               
158 Id. at 530. 
   If other climate change cases can name a plaintiff with a quasi-sovereign status 
and an injury to an interest held by the quasi-sovereign, like the Native Village plaintiff 
in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, it may be easier to establish standing. 
159 Id. at 522. 
160 Id. at 522, citing Georgia. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
161 Mass. v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 549 U.S. at 522. 
162 Id. at 524-525. 
163 Id. at 526. 
164 Id. at 525-526.  
165 Id. at 526. 
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Like the political question doctrine, the challenge of proving standing may be 
lessening.  In light of upcoming EPA regulations, states or other quasi-sovereign 
plaintiffs may be better able to establish an injury, traceability, and relief through the 
EPA’s own findings of the sources and dangers of GHG emissions.  As the EPA 
recognizes emission sources such as fossil-fuel burning industry as significant 
contributors to GHG emissions, climate change plaintiffs may rely on this recognition to 
overcome the traceability element of standing.  These emerging regulations are discussed 
in the following section.   
C. Climate Change Regulation on the Horizon 
Although climate change litigation to date has not been successful on the merits, 
there are now emerging carbon dioxide regulations following Mass. v. EPA.  Discussed 
above, the plaintiffs in Mass. v. EPA were concerned that the EPA was not regulating 
carbon dioxide and other GHGs pursuant to the CAA.166
On the merits, the Supreme Court held that under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, 
the EPA must determine if GHGs cause or contribute to climate change.  Section 
202(a)(1) of the CAA states the EPA shall regulate air pollutants from new motor 
vehicles if the pollutants “cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
  Having established that the 
plaintiffs had standing, the Court proceeded to hear the case.   
167  The Court’s holding required only 
that EPA make a finding whether or not GHGs present a threat to the public health or 
welfare and provide reasoning for its determination.168
                                               
166 Id. at 504. 
  Because the EPA had not 
167 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
168 Mass. v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 549 U.S. at 533. 
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declared any reason for not regulating GHGs, the Court found EPA’s inaction was 
arbitrary and capricious.169
Although the case was decided in 2007, EPA took no action to determine if GHGs 
cause or contribute to climate change and if this presents a danger to public health or 
welfare until 2009.  In January 2010, the EPA’s endangerment finding final rule went 
into effect establishing that carbon dioxide may endanger the public health or welfare.
 
170  
On April 1, 2010 the EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a 
joint final rule setting emissions and fuel economy standards for new motor vehicles in 
the United States.171  On March 27, 2012 EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson signed a 
proposed rule which sets performance standards for carbon dioxide emissions for new 
fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units.  The proposed rule, which is awaiting 
publication in the Federal Register for public comment, applies only to new electricity 
utilities over 25 megawatt electric (MWe) to meet an output-based standard of 1,000 
pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour.172
These new regulations may develop a regulatory scheme that will provide courts 
with standards to apply in future climate change litigation.  Such a scheme would help 
litigants overcome the political question doctrine by providing the courts with emissions 
standards.  If the EPA continues to expand regulation of carbon dioxide and eventually 
sets an emissions cap for carbon dioxide, this would set a standard which the courts could 
determine is an acceptable or unacceptable amount of emissions from a particular source.  
Much like the NAAQS for sulfur dioxide helped the courts determine what level of sulfur 
   
                                               
169 Id. at 534-535. 
170 40 C.F.R. § 52.21. 
171 74 Fed. Reg. 25323, 25324 (May 7, 2010). 
172 EPA, Proposed Rule, http://epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/20120327proposal.pdf (accessed 
April 23, 2012). 
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dioxide emissions were permissible, a ruling by the EPA on an acceptable level of carbon 
dioxide emissions would ease a court’s difficulty in determining whether a certain level 
carbon dioxide emissions is reasonable. 
IV. Getting Comprehensive Climate Change Regulation:  Learning 
from Asbestos and Sulfur Dioxide  
 
Looking to past environmental health problems in the U.S., the common law and 
litigation have been important steps along the road to national regulation to protect the 
public from harmful environmental agents.  Many concerned with the effects of GHGs 
have already turned to the court system and common law remedies in search of relief 
from climate change’s effects.  If climate change litigants continue to rely on traditional 
common law theories, causation will likely be a difficult hurdle for plaintiff to overcome.   
To date, no climate change case moving forward on a common law case theory 
has reached the merits of the case.  The cases are often thrown out on grounds of political 
question, standing, or legislation occupying the field.  Should a climate change litigant 
continue to follow a state common law case theory and is able to overcome political 
question and standing, plaintiffs will still face challenges in proving causation, which is a 
required element of a common law torts claims.  Past common law asbestos and sulfur 
dioxide cases provide comparisons with present climate change litigation and allow 
predictions regarding the future of climate change litigation and regulation. 
A. Asbestos, Sulfur Dioxide and Climate Change:  General 
Comparisons 
 
Asbestos, sulfur dioxide, and climate change all share several commonalities.  
First, each substance is naturally occurring and generally invisible to the naked eye.  
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Asbestos is a naturally occurring fiber mined from geologic formations in the earth.173  
Sulfur dioxide is a naturally occurring gas, emitted when fossil fuels are burned, 
including during volcanic eruptions.174  Most of the GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide, 
are naturally occurring as well, emitted from a variety of sources, including human 
respiration.175
Second, as with asbestos and sulfur dioxide, the dangers of GHGs and climate 
change were known long before comprehensive regulation existed to remedy the harm 
presented by each substance.  Asbestos was a known public health risk from 1907,
   
176 but 
was not subject to federal regulation until the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970.177  Sulfur dioxide was a known public health threat causing respiratory disease 
from the 1930s178 and a known environmental hazard causing damage to water sources 
and vegetation from 1907.179  Since 1824, scientists have been studying GHGs and their 
effects on the climate,180 yet only since 2010 have piecemeal federal administrative 
regulations of GHGs been established to reduce the impacts of climate change.181
Finally, while each of these substances is naturally occurring, each poses a greater 
threat to human health when humans interfere with the substance.  Asbestos fibers are not 
  Each 
substance has waited decades from when it was discovered as a public health risk to 
national regulation was enacted.  Along the way principles of common law have helped 
plaintiffs receive remedies for injuries suffered by the unregulated substances.   
                                               
173 EPA, supra n. 4. 
174 EPA, Volcanoes, http://www.epa.gov/naturaldisasters/volcanoes.html (last updated July 14, 2011). 
175 EPA.  Climate Change:  Greenhouse Gas Emissions, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ 
index.html (Feb. 27, 2012). 
176 Morris Greenberg, supra n. 14. 
177 P.W.J. Bartrip, supra n. 15 at 73. 
178 C. Arden Pope III, David V. Bates, and Mark E. Raizenne,  supra n. 52. 
179 Gene E. Likens, F. Herbert Bormann, and Noye M. Johnson, supra n. 52 at 35. 
180 Matthew Knight, supra n. 94 
181 Mass. v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 549 U.S. at 534-535; 40 C.F.R. § 52.21. 
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dangerous to human health until they are disturbed and become airborne.182  As humans 
burn fossil fuels, sulfur dioxide is released at rates greatly exceeding natural emissions 
levels.183  Similarly, as humans burn fossil fuels, carbon dioxide and other GHGs are also 
emitted into the atmosphere at unprecedented levels.184
B. Proving Causation 
  Without human action, the health 
threats posed by asbestos, sulfur dioxide, and GHGs would be significantly less 
concerning.  These are a few of the general similarities shared by all three substances.  
Another area of similarity is the difficulty plaintiffs have in proving causation to establish 
a personal injury claim. 
 
In order to be successful on a common law claim, a plaintiff must prove that he or 
she suffered a particular injury and that the injury would not have occurred without the 
defendant’s action or inaction.  In climate change, many challenges have been raised 
arguing that because so many different sources emit GHGs, no particular defendant may 
be held liable for a plaintiff’s injury.  Climate change plaintiffs also face challenges that 
the injury suffered is not actually caused by increased GHG emissions.  Discussed below 
are two possible methods that were successful in asbestos and sulfur dioxide litigation 
and may also allow climate change plaintiffs to overcome the causation hurdle.   
1. The Substantial Factor Test  
 
In order for tort litigation to succeed, the plaintiff must prove a particular 
defendant caused a specific injury.  Many asbestos plaintiffs faced difficulty in proving 
which asbestos manufacturer specifically provided the asbestos that resulted in illness.  
The difficultly in proving causation in asbestos cases arose when an asbestos plaintiff 
                                               
182 EPA, supra n. 4. 
183 EPA, supra n. 50. 
184 IPCC, supra n. 93 at 5. 
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worked for years in an industry exposed to many different sources of asbestos.  In Borel 
v. Fireboard, the court responded to this with the substantial factor test.185  The 
substantial factor test states that if a plaintiff can show multiple sufficient cases of the 
plaintiff’s harm and each individual cause is sufficient to bring about the harm, the 
plaintiff may hold all sources of the harm liable.186
Plaintiffs in Kivalina asserted a similar claim, arguing the named defendants are 
all major GHG emitters and each substantially contributed to a warming climate and 
melting the protective ice shelf that made the village habitable.
   
187
Plaintiffs in Kivalina carefully cataloged the nation’s largest emitters of GHGs 
and selected a venue where the most of these polluters conducted business.
 GHGs are emitted from 
many sources and no discrete source can be determined to cause a specific, individual 
harm.  It is therefore likely climate change plaintiffs like in Kivalina, will have to 
carefully select the most egregious GHG emitters and demonstrate the defendants 
contribute a significant portion of global GHGs.   
188  Plaintiffs 
alleged that just 19 companies in the fossil fuel energy sector accounted for half of all 
electricity emissions in 2004.189
                                               
185 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d at 1095. 
  Because the district court dismissed the case on political 
question grounds, it is unclear whether the plaintiffs successfully alleged the defendants 
substantially contributed to their injury.  Hopefully, climate change plaintiffs will be able 
to assert that the sources of greatest GHG emissions in the U.S. substantially contributed 
to the total GHG concentration and this is sufficient to bring about the harms of climate 
186 Black’s Law Dictionary, 1470 (8th ed., West 2004). 
187 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1. 
188 Br. of App. at 6-9, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009), appeal filed. 
189 Id. 
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change.  Until a climate change claim relying on a common law theory of liability 
overcomes the threshold challenges of the political question doctrine and standing, it is 
unclear how the courts will address causation when multiple defendants are attributed 
with emitting sizable levels of GHGs.   
2. Proving Causation with Improved Science 
While awaiting a decision from the court system allowing a climate change case 
to proceed to the merits and address the substantial factor test, other evidence is building 
that may ease a climate change plaintiff’s ability to prove causation.  Proving causation 
becomes easier as science improves.  This was the case in asbestos and sulfur dioxide 
litigation and is very likely to be true in climate change litigation.  In asbestos cases, 
plaintiffs had a difficult time proving causation until medical studies improved to 
establish that a plaintiff’s illness was the result of asbestos dust inhalation.190  Similarly, 
proving that a defendant’s sulfur dioxide emissions caused a plaintiff’s harm also eased 
as scientific evidence of the potential harm of sulfur dioxide increased.191  After scientists 
established a link between sulfur dioxide emissions released during the combustion of 
fossil fuels, plaintiffs did not have a significant problem proving their injury was the 
result of sulfur dioxide emissions.192
Proving causation in climate change litigation is especially challenging as some 
GHG emissions are naturally occurring and GHGs have a global impact, unlike sulfur 
  Because sulfur dioxide emissions are most 
damaging near the source of the emission, most plaintiffs were able to show the nearest 
sizable source of sulfur dioxide emissions caused the injury. 
                                               
190 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d at 1083. 
191 C. Arden Pope III, David V. Bates, and Mark E. Raizenne, supra n. 52 at 472; Gene E. Likens, F. 
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192 McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (1904); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 
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dioxide’s localized impact.  However, proving causation in climate change litigation is 
becoming easier as climate science continues to improve the certainty that climate change 
is caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions.  The IPCC reviews the “most recent 
scientific, technical, and socio-economic information” from around the world relating to 
climate science.193  The IPCC continues to find stronger evidence that humans are 
producing more GHG emissions than at any previous time, causing average global 
temperatures to rise.194  While the IPCC’s science has not gone unchallenged, the review 
process conducted by the IPCC is quite rigorous.195  In total, more than 190 countries 
must reach a scientific consensus on the materials produced by the IPCC.196
Given the rigorous review process and the vast number of countries and expert 
scientists reporting on climate change, the assessments released by the IPCC will help 
plaintiffs clear the causation hurdle.  Like the improved studies in asbestos and sulfur 
dioxide litigation, as climate science continues to become more reliable and convincing, 
  This 
exacting review process ensures the IPCC Assessment Reports accurately represent the 
available scientific research.   
                                               
193 IPCC, Organization, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (accessed April 8, 2012).  
194 IPCC, supra n. 93 at 2, 5.   
195 First, authors of research submitted to the IPCC are compiled so the appropriate expert reviewers may 
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196 David Biello, Negating Climategate, 302 Sci. Am. 16, 16 (Feb. 2010).  
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climate litigants will be able to satisfy the threshold standing requirements of injury and 
traceability elements and the substantive element of causation.   
C. Lessons in Litigation and Regulation:  Will the Future of 
Climate Change Look more like Asbestos of Sulfur Dioxide? 
 
The common law provides an avenue for plaintiffs to seek a remedy, either a 
monetary damage award to repair a past harm or an injunction to stop the harm from 
continuing.  It also raises awareness of the severity of the public health risk and arguably 
plays a role in bringing about the federal regulation.  Some federal regulations, like those 
regulating asbestos, still allow plaintiffs to bring personal injury claims under state 
common law theories.  Other federal regulations have largely closed out the opportunity 
for plaintiffs to continue to rely on federal common law theories.  An examination of 
these common law theories illuminates whether climate change plaintiffs will be 
successful in continuing to rely on common law theories.  This is an important question 
in light of the recent Conn. v. AEP decision and the Kivalina v. ExxonMobil case waiting 
a decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  If climate change plaintiffs are able 
to succeed on the merits of a case, this may bring about comprehensive legislation of 
GHGs as was the case with asbestos and sulfur dioxide. 
1. Federal Common Law as a Theory of Liability 
The climate change cases discussed above demonstrate that many climate change 
plaintiffs are relying on federal and state common law nuisance case theories.  As the 
EPA has begun to regulate carbon dioxide under the CAA, this alters the availability of 
common law nuisance claims for climate change plaintiffs.  The federal common law is 
limited to specialized areas where an overriding federal interest requires a uniform rule or 
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basic federalism interests are involved and federal legislation does not provide a rule.197  
Federal common law was limited to specialized cases following Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins which established that federal courts should apply the law of the forum state in 
diversity jurisdiction cases,198 but some federal common law was reserved.199  
Specialized federal common law is typically reserved for interstate pollution as in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. where Georgia sought to enjoin copper companies near 
the state line from emitting sulfur dioxide causing damage to land in Georgia.200
The change from a wide body of federal common law to specialized common law 
demonstrates the reason few sulfur dioxide cases relying on federal common law exist 
today.  Today, as represented by American Lung Assoc v. EPA, many sulfur dioxide cases 
focus on enforcing or strengthening existing regulations.  Since promulgation of the 1990 
CAA Amendments directly regulating sulfur dioxide it is likely the courts will view the 
federal common law for regulating sulfur dioxide has been displaced.  The 1990 CAA 
Amendments directly speak to sulfur dioxide emissions and the EPA has set standards 
establishing maximum sulfur dioxide emissions from a variety of interstate sources.  The 
federal common law is therefore displaced by federal regulation.   
   
This is the same conclusion reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in the climate 
change case Conn. v. AEP.201
                                               
197 Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972), citing Banca National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398, 421-427 (1964). 
  In Conn. v. AEP the Court held that when the EPA made 
its endangerment finding that carbon dioxide caused or contributed to “air pollution … 
reasonably anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare”  and began promulgating 
198 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 63 (1938). 
199 Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. 
200 Georgia. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230. 
201 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
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regulations pursuant to the CAA, that was enough to displace federal common law on 
carbon dioxide emissions.202
Many asbestos claims still rely on common law theories, however.  The 
distinction between asbestos and sulfur dioxide case theories rests in the fact that sulfur 
dioxide common law cases were brought under federal common law nuisance, whereas 
asbestos common law cases proceeded under state common law theories of negligence, 
strict liability, and breach of warranty.  The 1990 CAA Amendments spoke directly to 
sulfur dioxide interstate pollution and has therefore displaced federal common law.  
Although there are many federal statutes regulating asbestos, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
not ruled whether a federal statute can displace state common law.
   
203
Federal legislation displacing federal common law will impact climate change 
litigation.  Until the last two years, GHGs were not subject to federal regulation.  This left 
only the common law for climate change plaintiffs to bring a claim.  In light of the recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Conn. v. AEP, the federal common law is no longer 
available to climate change plaintiffs.  It is unclear whether climate change plaintiffs will 
be successful in suing under state common law theories.  The upcoming decision from 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil may answer this question.  
It is likely, however, that as the EPA promulgates GHG regulations, climate change 
plaintiffs will be able to sue to enforce these regulations rather than rely on federal 
common law theories.  
  Until the Supreme 
Court rules otherwise, state common law theories relied upon by asbestos plaintiffs will 
not be displaced by federal statutes.   
                                               
202 Id. 
203 Thomas C. Buchele.  State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control Statutes:  Can the 
Work Together?  U. Ill. L. Rev. 609, 640-642 (1986). 
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2. Following Sulfur Dioxide’s Example 
Because the federal common law is now likely closed to climate change plaintiffs, 
it is likely that climate change litigation will more closely follow the historic path of 
sulfur dioxide regulation than asbestos regulation.  While asbestos has a similarly long 
history documenting its dangerous health risks leading up to many federal statutes, many 
personal injury claims for asbestos persist and rely on state common law theories.  
Because federal regulations are not held to displace state common law causes of action 
and many people will continue to discover latent exposure to asbestos, it is likely 
asbestos claims will continue to seek damage awards for people with asbestos-related 
diseases.   
Sulfur dioxide’s regulatory history is marked by a long history of public and 
environmental health problems, followed by litigation seeking to stop the polluting 
emissions, followed by strong federal regulations.  For those looking to reduce GHG 
emissions contributing to climate change, looking to sulfur dioxide may provide a model 
for comprehensive regulation.  Recent EPA regulation of carbon dioxide may lay the 
groundwork for a comprehensive regulatory scheme addressing GHG emissions.  
Although the current regulations are few in number and only address new carbon dioxide 
sources, the EPA has now taken an important initial step toward regulation.  Additionally, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held these regulations are sufficient to displace federal common 
law, closing the most popular theory of liability for climate change plaintiffs.204
                                               
204 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
  
However, a few regulations only addressing future carbon dioxide emissions will surely 
fall short of bringing about a significant reduction in GHG emissions.  In light of this, it 
is probable that only significant federal legislation will actually result in considerable 
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GHG emissions reductions in the U.S.  That was the case with the sulfur dioxide 
emissions regulations and Acid Rain Program under the 1990 CAA Amendments.   
Until the federal government makes a deliberate decision to regulate GHGs and 
passes legislation to that effect, it is likely that many concerned with climate change will 
continue to rely on the judicial process and state common law theories.  Without 
comprehensive federal legislation addressing climate change, the court system is the 
primary avenue to reducing GHG emissions.  Not only this, but it is likely that the threat 
of litigation and high damage awards may push major GHG emitters to favor 
comprehensive GHG legislation because then the major GHG emitters would know 
exactly what level of emissions is acceptable.  This was the case for sulfur dioxide 
emitters after the 1990 CAA Amendments and Acid Rain Program.  Now sulfur dioxide 
emitters know what level of emissions is acceptable and are not in fear of litigation so 
long as they abide by the federal standards.  While it may be many years before major 
GHG emitters feel enough pressure to call for federal GHG emission standards, the threat 
of common law litigation and possibly astronomical damage awards205
The fate of climate change in the court system is still unpredictable and changes 
with every court decision.  As previously noted, no climate change case relying on 
common law theories has reached the merits of the case.  Current cases like Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil will further shape the future of climate change litigation.  If the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals finds that no political question is presented and the plaintiffs have 
 or injunctions 
stopping all emissions may encourage major GHG emitters to support national 
legislation.   
                                               
205 Plaintiffs in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil did not specify a damage amount, but alleged it would cost $95 to 
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standing, which are likely in light of Conn. v. AEP, and that a claim has been asserted 
under state common law, this may be the first climate change case to reach the merits of 
the claim.  Only then will we know if climate change plaintiffs can rely on the judicial 
system to provide a remedy.   
Looking forward, the extent of EPA’s regulation of carbon dioxide and how the 
courts address state common law claims will determine whether or not climate change is 
regulated without new federal legislation.  If one looks to the history of sulfur dioxide, 
however, it suggests that national legislation is required in order to effectively address 
climate change. 
V. Conclusion 
Asbestos, sulfur dioxide, and climate change all share characteristics like 
invisibility to the naked eye, long histories as known environmental agents presenting 
health risks, and all relied on both the court system and legislative process to reduce the 
public health risk.  The histories of these substances demonstrate it often takes many 
years from the discovery of a hazardous substance until it is heavily regulated by the 
federal government.  Also, before the U.S. Congress passes federal legislation to protect 
the public health, there is often a long history of plaintiffs relying on common law 
principles to seek a remedy after they have suffered an injury from a pollutant.  After the 
court system has spent years trying to balance the need to provide a remedy for those who 
have been injured by a polluter with the polluter’s need to emit harmful sources, federal 
legislation is then enacted to help draw a more definitive line establishing an acceptable 
level of pollution.   
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While asbestos, sulfur dioxide, and GHGs share similarities, when their histories 
are compared to predict the future of climate change regulation, it is likely that climate 
change will more closely follow sulfur dioxide’s regulatory history.  Learning from sulfur 
dioxide, it is probable that climate change will only be effectively regulated following 
strong, deliberate federal legislation setting comprehensive emissions standards for the 
largest GHG emitters.  Until such legislation is enacted, however, climate change 
plaintiffs will continue to turn to the court system to address climate change. 
